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How do international institutions affect the likelihood that states will compromise their preferences in order to achieve or sustain international cooperation? Although generally focused on the relative effects of anarchy and institutions in international affairs (Keohane 1984, Oye 1986, Grieco 1988), this question is equally relevant to debates over the dynamics of regional integration. The late and weak integration of foreign and security policy in Europe has led many observers to consider this issue-area immune to any cooperation-promoting effects of institutions. Unfortunately, this supposition has not been subject to sufficient theoretical development or empirical research.
	Scholarship on the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) has focused in recent years on explaining the institutions that govern this “new” area of EU activity (Nuttall 2000, White 2001, M.E. Smith 2004, Koenig-Archibugi 2004a, Tonra and Christiansen 2004). In comparison, relatively little attention has been devoted to developing theories of EU policy-making under CFSP or to evaluating empirically how well such theories explain patterns or critical cases of EU foreign policy. As a result, despite some work in this area (K. Smith 1999, Ginsburg 2001), we have insufficient understanding of the dynamics of foreign policy cooperation among the EU member states, how they arrive at common policies on critical international issues (or fail to do so), why they agree on certain policies rather than others, and how they act after the common policies have been agreed. 
	This paper introduces Intergovernmentalist and Institutionalist theories of EU foreign policymaking, and then evaluates their explanatory power in light of two case studies of EU cooperation on a high salience issue – how to respond to the United States’ quest for immunity from the International Criminal Court, first through a United Nations Security Council resolution, and then through bilateral agreements. In both cases, member-state preferences diverged considerably. However, the first case involves cooperation among EU member states outside the institutions and process of the CFSP, while the second case involves cooperation within the CFSP. While this case selection does not represent the universe of EU foreign policy actions, tracing the policy-making process and comparing the policy outcomes in the two cases contributes to theory development by demonstrating the plausibility of both theories under specified conditions (George and McKeown 1985).
	At first glance, the EU’s ability to shape international outcomes appears to be hamstrung by a “Catch-22” dilemma in the CFSP. On the one hand, even though none of the European Union’s member states is powerful enough to shape international outcomes single-handedly, there is good reason to believe that the EU could be a major player if the member-states could concentrate their weight on a single substantive position (Jupille 1999). On the other hand, since the CFSP operates on the principle of unanimity, many observers consider it inevitable that EU positions in foreign policy will fall somewhere between the status quo and the lowest-common denominator positions. By increasing the number of potential veto players, enlargement from fifteen to twenty-five member states (with more to come) should only reinforce this tendency (Tsebelis 2002). The EU thus appears unlikely to agree on a position that departs significantly from the preferences of whichever single member state is least receptive to change on the issue at hand (Hill 1983).
	Some analysts treat this as an iron-rule of decision making under unanimity: “When each member state possesses the power of veto, whether at the outset of a negotiation or at the ratification stage, the common position eventually reached is the lowest common denominator” (Meunier 2000:109). This is correct, of course, if one formally equates any non-status quo outcome with the preferences of the most conservative actor. This equation blinds us, however, to the possibility that some aspect(s) of the policy-making process might lead member states to forego the pursuit of outcomes that they prefer with respect to the issue at hand. For this reason, the lowest common denominator outcome is better treated as an empirical possibility than as a theoretical assumption.
	This paper challenges the expectation that the EU will inevitably adopt highly conservative positions on critical international issues. Instead, it argues that within the CFSP process, the ability of EU actors (both member-states and supranational institutions) to play an entrepreneurial role and frame issues publicly before they reach the Council, as well as the power of norms of consensus within the Council, can move EU positions from a status quo or lowest-common denominator position toward a less-conservative or compromise position. 

Part I. The Rules and Instruments of EU Foreign Policy
The Common Foreign and Security Policy emerged out of the intergovernmental process known as European Political Cooperation (EPC), which developed a considerable body of substantive commitments and procedural norms on foreign policy cooperation during the 1970s and 80s. CFSP was formally established, however, by the Treaty on European Union in 1992 and expanded by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. Its formal rules grant principal policy-making authority to the Council (rather than the Commission, Court or Parliament) and give considerable bargaining power to individual member states with respect to the adoption of particular policies. The EU’s adoption of legally binding common foreign policies has increased considerably since the establishment of CFSP, from an average of almost 16 per year during 1993-1995 to an average greater than 60 per year in 2001-2003 (see Figure 1).
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Note: This table includes only CFSP acts based on articles in the Treaty on European Union or on pre-existing CFSP acts. Council Declarations, Presidency Declarations, and Council Conclusions are not included. Source: Actes Juridiques PESC: Liste Thématique, 18 juin 2004, http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Actes.legisl.pdf (​http:​/​​/​ue.eu.int​/​uedocs​/​cmsUpload​/​Actes.legisl.pdf​) (December 6, 2004).


for CFSP, common strategies, which set overall policy guidelines for relations with particular countries or regions where the member states have especially important interests in common, and specify the objectives, duration, and means to be made available by the Union and member states. Once adopted, they can be implemented by common positions and joint actions adopted by a qualified majority of the Council. However, common strategies are relatively rare (see Table 1). In their absence, both common positions and joint actions must be adopted by unanimity 
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All proposals for CFSP action (regardless of which policy instrument they involve) are ultimately debated, amended, approved, or rejected by the EU’s General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), which is composed of Foreign Ministers and meets on a monthly basis or more frequently when urgent decisions are required. Before an issue reaches the GAERC, it is typically addressed in a series of lower-ranking Council bodies, from expert working groups, to the Political and Security Committee (PSC), and eventually the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER). Since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the European Commission has been “fully associated” with the CFSP, which allows it to participate in Council formations alongside member states, but not to vote. For its part, the European Parliament is able to submit questions and recommendations (in the form of resolutions) to the Council, but it


Table 1: EU Legal Acts under CFSP, 1993-2003













Note: “Common Positions” refers to acts based on Art. J-2 or 15 of the Treaty on European Union; “Joint Actions” refers to acts based on Art. J-3 or 14; “Common Strategies” refers to acts based on Art. 13 (which was not in effect until 1999). “Implementing Acts” refers to acts whose principal juridical basis is a pre-existing Common Position, Joint Action or Common Strategy. “Other” refers to acts based on other articles in Title V of the Treaty. Source: Actes Juridiques PESC: Liste Thématique, 18 juin 2004, http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/Actes.legisl.pdf (​http:​/​​/​ue.eu.int​/​uedocs​/​cmsUpload​/​Actes.legisl.pdf​) (December 6, 2004).
cannot participate in Council deliberations at any level and has no veto over the decisions of the GAERC. 
In addition to common strategies, joint actions, and common positions, CFSP deliberations may result in Declarations by the EU Council or Presidency or in Conclusions by the GAERC on particular issues. Although these supplemental instruments have been used continuously since the days of EPC, 
they are not mentioned in the Treaty on European Union and are thus politically (but not legally) binding on the member states. Like the CFSP’s legal instruments, the adoption of the political instruments requires the unanimous support of the member states. In the following pages, the five CFSP instruments (legal and political) are referred to as “common policies.”
This catalogue of policy instruments and decision-making processes demonstrates the formal dominance of member states and unanimity voting in the CFSP. With the exception of measures taken to implement common strategies, all CFSP instruments require unanimous support and are thus subject to veto by a single member state. Even where qualified majority voting is permitted, an individual member state may block it if they argue that the policy in question impinges upon important national interests. If a member state does so, the Council may decide by qualified majority to refer the matter to the European Council for a unanimous decision by heads of state and government. It is therefore hardly surprising that some skeptics of CFSP view it as a “European rescue” of national foreign policy (Allen 1996; see also Koenig-Archibugi 2004b).


By general agreement among the member states, the CFSP does not apply to issues that are especially sensitive to a particular member state (generally for historical or geographic reasons), though this domaine réservé has contracted over time (M.E.Smith 2004). When issues are under consideration in forums where all the EU member states are not represented, such as the G-8 or the UN Security Council, member states participating in these forums are expected to take account of existing EU positions and to inform their EU partners about the deliberations.
The EU Constitutional Treaty that was signed in Rome in October 2004 maintains member states’ rights to abstain from voting on common policies that they do not wish to support, and thus facilitates the adoption of common policies in the absence of unanimous support. However, the Constitution would not prevent an individual member state from exercising a veto over the Union’s foreign and defense policy when it so desired, nor would it transfer significant authority in this area to supranational bodies such as the Commission or Parliament. In a White Paper on the new Constitution, the British government commented, “When we don’t agree, there is no common policy.”​[1]​
Given these rules, salient outcomes for EU foreign policy include the status quo, lowest common denominator, and compromise. A status quo outcome could reflect a shared preference among the member states not to adopt a common policy on the issue at hand, or a failure to agree on a common policy, or a failure to agree to change an existing common policy. (In any of these cases, member states retain the right to act independently or in small groups.) A lowest common denominator policy would reflect convergence around the policy preference of the member state that is least receptive to change. A compromise policy would reflect mutual concession by the member states with the most extreme preferences.

Part II. Theories of EU Foreign Policymaking
This section of the paper introduces two theories of CFSP policy-making based upon distinct approaches to European integration and international relations: Intergovernmentalism and Institutionalism. One views the European Union as an intergovernmental forum for bargaining among sovereign states unencumbered by supranational institutions, sub-state or non-state actors, while the other views the EU as a multi-level polity in which a society of states is nested within a transnational society of supranational institutions, sub-state and non-state actors whose dynamics exert significant effects on the behavior of the member states. Following discussion of both theories, Table 2 summarizes their key elements. 

Intergovernmentalism
The intergovernmentalist theory of CFSP is based on theories of European integration that portray the European Union as a forum for bargaining between member states (Hoffmann 1966; Grieco; 1988; Moravcsik 1993 & 1998). As a theory of EU foreign policy, it assumes that neither supranational nor non-state actors exert any direct and significant influence over policy outcomes; instead, it explains policy outcomes in terms of the rational or self-interested calculations of the member states (Hill 1983). The key decision-makers are assumed to be national executive authorities (typically prime ministers and foreign ministers); neither lower-ranking national officials nor supranational officials nor non-governmental actors are assumed to exercise any significant power over national preferences or Union-level outcomes. Similarly, the theory assumes that each member state’s participation in the CFSP process is driven by its national interests, and that its preferences with respect to any given policy issue are determined independently of interactions or negotiations at the EU level. The theory would be agnostic, however, with respect to whether member state preferences are shaped by the strategic calculations of national executives (as assumed by Realist approaches to international relations) or by domestic structures, lobbies and public opinion (as assumed by Liberal approaches) (contrast Mastanduno, Lake and Ikenberry 1989 and Moravcsik 1993). 
According to the intergovernmental theory, the dominant dynamic in EU foreign policy-making is bargaining among the member states within constraints established by the formal rules of CFSP. The theory views the rules as reflections of the long-term self-interested calculations of the member states that created them, and does not attribute to them any influence over the identities, interests or preferences of the member states themselves. Intergovernmentalist theory thus asserts that EU foreign policymaking is dominated by the preferences of the member states and by the formal rules that they have established to govern the CFSP. 
Given the aforementioned assumptions, and the fact that CFSP decision-making proceeds formally on the basis of unanimity, the intergovernmental theory generates three expectations. First and foremost, if one of the member states prefers the status quo over all alternatives, then it will block any changes proposed by other member states. As a result, the EU will often fail to adopt common policies, even on issues that all member states consider to be very important.
Second, when member states do agree on a common policy, its content is most likely to be determined by the lowest-common denominator, meaning the preference of the member state least interested in change. This expectation derives from the fact that every member state has a veto over the adoption of any common policy, and the assumption the most conservative member state will veto (or simply threaten to veto) any proposed policy that is further from the status quo than its own ideal policy. Alternatively, the EU may adopt a common policy that simply confirms or reiterates the status quo
Third, individual member states will take an exploitative approach to whatever common policy is adopted, complying with its basic terms while exercising whatever leeway it allows for them to pursue their own interests. This expectation derives from the dual assumption that that member states’ interests and preferences are unaffected by the rules or process of CFSP but that a common policy would not be adopted if any of the member states found it less preferable than the status quo. 

Institutionalism
The institutionalist theory of CFSP draws on sociological institutionalist and constructivist approaches to European integration (Risse-Kappen 1996; Jǿrgensen 1997a; Diez and Whitman 2002; Checkel 2003) and world politics (Finnemore 1996; Katzenstein 1996; Johnston 2001). It emphasizes the social construction of foreign policy identities, interests and preferences within the EU, which is assumed to have characteristics of both international and transnational society. The theory thus focuses on entrapment, socialization, and shaming as critical determinants of policy-making within the Union. In this sense, the institutionalist theory takes seriously the distinction between nation-states and member-states (Sbragia 1994).
The institutionalist theory of CFSP also conceives of the EU as a multi-level polity involving intergovernmental, transgovernmental and transnational levels of policy formation (Marks, Hooghe, Blanks 1996; Pollack and Shaffer 2001). As a result, the theory attributes a potentially significant role to supranational actors (such as the European Commission and European Parliament), sub-state actors (such as staffs from the national foreign ministries), and non-state actors (including media, lobbies and NGOs).
With respect to the intergovernmental level of CFSP, institutionalist theory asserts that the impact of EU rules and institutions cannot be reduced to the exogenous interests or preferences of the member states (Sandholtz 1996; Lewis 1997 & 2003; Haas 2004). In particular, the theory emphasizes two mechanisms by which participation in EU institutions over time systematically transforms how member states perceive and pursue their interests. First of all, the CFSP process has generated a set of public commitments to certain policy goals that constrain the ability of individual member states to pursue divergent preferences with respect to particular choices. In order to pursue divergent preferences, a member state must run the risk that domestic public opinion would not appreciate the departure from prior commitments and be willing to suffer the resentments of other member states that made concessions to achieve the original collective commitment. In short, member states find themselves entrapped by their prior political commitments (Schimmelfennig 2002). The acquis politique thus functions as a powerful counterbalance to the formal possibility of unit veto under the unanimity rule for CFSP (Young 2000). 
Furthermore, CFSP and the EPC process that preceded it have ‘Europeanized’ foreign policy professionals from the member states and generated consensus-oriented procedural norms for CFSP decision making. In particular, an informal CFSP norm has developed incrementally since the days of EPC indicating that member states should seek to develop a common policy on issues of great significance and that all are expected to compromise to achieve that end (Jǿrgensen 1997b; Regelsberger 1997; M.E. Smith 2004a, chap.7). As a result, notwithstanding a member state’s preferences with regard to a particular policy issue, it will be reluctant to ‘break ranks.’ Taken together, these factors increase the value that EU member states attach to achieving and maintaining common policies. 
The transgovernmental level involves “sets of direct interactions among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled by the policies of cabinets or chief executives of those governments” (Keohane and Nye 1974:43). In CFSP, this involves contacts between expert staff from the national foreign ministries, the Council’s CFSP secretariat and the Commission’s Directorate General for External Relations, which occur both informally and through meetings of the Council’s many specialized working groups, such as COASIE (dealing with policy toward Asia) or COHOM (dealing with policy on human rights). Through these contacts, EU foreign policy experts at the working level become a distinct transgovernmental community with shared policy preferences (perhaps based on a shared identity) that differ from those of the member states or institutions that they represent.
	Finally, the transnational level involves interactions across national borders between non-state and state or supranational actors (Keohane and Nye 1973, Risse-Kappen 1995). In CFSP, this typically involves exchanges of ideas and information between non-governmental organizations and policy lobbies on the one hand, and the staff of national foreign ministries or the EU’s supranational institutions, on the other. These exchanges may coalesce into de facto “transnational advocacy networks” on CFSP through which supranational, sub-state and non-state actors together advance a shared agenda (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Finally, the transnational level of CFSP policy formation also involves the ability of European media to publicize policy deliberations before they are complete, and thus to increase public pressure on decision-makers.
	Given the aforementioned assumptions, the institutionalist theory of EU foreign policymaking generates three expectations that contrast directly with those of intergovernmental theory. First and foremost, individual member states will be reluctant to pursue policy preferences that could undermine the achievement of consensus within the Council. Moreover, the member state holding the EU presidency will refrain from pursuing its own preferences and instead engage in consultations designed to identify a possible consensus (Forwood 2001). As a result, the EU will often succeed in adopting common policies despite wide divergences among member states’ preferences.
	Second, the content of EU common policies is likely to reflect a significant compromise among member state preferences, rather than the lowest common denominator. This expectation derives from the assumption that while every member state has a veto over the adoption of any common policy, CFSP norms of consensus and compromise will lead them to value EU unity as much as their own preferences on the issue at hand. This expectation will only apply when issues are raised in the institutional context of CFSP; if not, lowest common denominator outcomes are likely.
Third, once a common policy is adopted through CFSP, member states will comply with its terms and hesitate to exploit whatever leeway it allows for them to pursue divergent interests. This expectation derives from the dual assumption that achievement of a common policy reflects a shared commitment to EU unity and the integrity of the CFSP process, and that a member state whose foreign policy behavior appears inconsistent with the spirit of a common policy would be subject to social sanctions (criticism, isolation, etc.) from other member states.
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In short, intergovernmental and institutionalist theories of EU foreign policymaking generate distinct policy expectations that can be evaluated empirically. The intergovernmental theory suggests that the EU will either fail to adopt common policies, adopt a common policy that confirms the status quo, or adopt a common policy that reflects the preference of the most conservative member state. It also suggests that member states will take an exploitative approach to whatever common policy is adopted. In contrast, the institutionalist theory suggests that the EU will adopt common policies that reflect a compromise among member state preferences, and will then seek to comply with its letter and spirit.

Part III: Background to the EU-US Clash over the ICC
One of the most politically sensitive issues on the CFSP agenda in recent years has been how to respond to the United States’ campaign for immunity from the International Criminal Court (ICC) – an institution that the EU and its member states strongly support. This section of the paper outlines the evolution and stakes of the EU-US dispute over the Court and the challenge it posed to CFSP. It then summarizes the two theories’ expectations with regard to how the EU




View of EU	Forum	Multi-level polity
View of member state’s preferences	Exogenous	Endogenous
Institutional condition	None	Council/CFSP
Key actors	National executives (heads of Government and foreign ministers of member states)	Supranational actors (Commission, European Parliament); national participants in CFSP bodies; national parliaments; NGOs; media
Key rules	Treaty rules	Informal norms
Key dynamics	Bargaining	Socialization, agenda setting, entrapment, shaming
Expected EU policy outcome	No common policy, status quo policy, or lowest common denominator policy	Compromise policy





would respond to US campaign for ICC immunity within the United Nations Security Council and then through bilateral agreements. In the process, it refers to the adoption of several CFSP instruments (common positions, joint actions, and declarations) during 2001-02 which elicited little controversy among the member states and are thus not analyzed here in detail.
The ICC is the world’s first permanent court designed to ensure individual accountability for the most serious crimes under international law: genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity. It was established by the Rome Statute of 1998, which entered into force on July 1, 2002. At present, 139 states have signed the Statute and 97 have ratified it. In addition to the list of crimes, the ICC’s jurisdiction is limited in a number of ways: the crime in question must have been committed after the Statute entered into force; the crime must have been committed on the territory of a state that accepts the jurisdiction of Rome Statute or by a national of such a state; the ICC may act only when national courts are “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution” (the principle of complementary jurisdiction); and the United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, may defer cases for 12 months, renewable indefinitely. The ICC’s eighteen judges, as well as the prosecutor and deputy prosecutor, are elected by the Assembly of States Party to the Statute. The Court’s procedures are consistent with international legal standards.
	The European Union has long supported the creation and functioning of the ICC, which is widely seen in Europe as a desirable (if limited) solution to the problem of impunity for international crimes. The EU’s member states played a central role in the “group of like-minded states” that pushed for a strong and effective ICC during the Rome negotiations (Benedetti and Washburn 1999; Fehl 2004). Since then, every EU member state has signed and ratified the Rome Statute, and most have adopted the necessary implementing legislation. The fact that these ratifications and legislative changes have been accomplished with strong support from both governing and opposition parties shows that the ICC enjoys broad popular support across Europe. Eight of the member states have contributed funds to the global non-governmental Coalition for the ICC.​[2]​
 	Echoing this sentiment, EU Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten declared, “In the twenty-first century, potential tyrants and mass murderers will know in advance that the international community is prepared to hold them accountable for massive violations of human life and dignity. It is our belief and our hope that this awareness will help reduce the frequency and the severity of such crimes. But when it does not, and the relevant national legal authorities are unwilling or unable to act, the international community will have in place a complementary system of criminal justice that is fair, transparent and effective.”​[3]​ Between 1995 and 2003, the European Commission’s European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights provided approximately € 13 million to the Advance Team setting up the ICC in The Hague, to the NGO Coalition for the ICC and other initiatives around the world that promote the ratification of the Rome Statute or the good functioning of the Court.​[4]​ Within the European Parliament, overwhelming majorities have repeatedly supported pro-ICC resolutions, and individual MEPs have championed the issue in public forums (e.g., Bonino 1998).
In contrast, the United States has never embraced the ICC. Although American negotiators achieved many of their objectives during the Rome negotiations (including the principle of complementary jurisdiction and the right of the Security Council to defer cases), the US was one of seven countries to vote against the Statute in 1998. The following year, the US Congress passed a law prohibiting the use of government funds to support the ICC, denying legal effect to ICC jurisdiction within the United States unless the US becomes a party to the Rome Statute, and barring extraditions of US citizens to third countries unless they agree not to surrender them to the ICC.​[5]​ President Clinton signed the ICC Statute three weeks before leaving office, but indicated to the Senate that he did not recommend ratification until further changes were made (Clinton 2001). 
With the transition from the Clinton to the Bush Administration, US ambivalence toward the Court was replaced by rejectionism. John Bolton, who had argued for years that the ICC was inconsistent with the US Constitution and a threat to US sovereignty, was named Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs (see Bolton 1998/99). In May 2001, House of Representatives Majority Leader Tom Delay introduced the American Service-members’ Protection Act (ASPA), which would prohibit cooperation with the ICC by any US agency or official, require the US to pursue ICC exemption for US participants in UN peacekeeping missions, prevent the transfer of US intelligence information to the ICC, prohibit US military aid to any States party to the ICC, and authorize the use of “all necessary means” to obtain the release of any American held by the ICC.
	Not surprisingly, the ASPA was seen in Europe as a legislative assault on the good functioning of the ICC. The bill’s threatened cut-off of US military aid was a powerful instrument, certain to influence the ICC policies of the many states around the world that depended on such assistance. Its “all necessary means” clause was also particularly worrisome to the Netherlands, on whose territory the ICC would be located. European critics of the proposed law began to call it the “Hague Invasion Act.”
Faced with such a clear challenge to an institution that it supported, and absent any significant dissension among the member states, the EU had little trouble achieving a unanimous response through CFSP. In June 2001, the EU issued its first Common Position on the ICC, which began, “The principles of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, as well as those governing its functions, are fully in line with the principles and objectives of the Union.” The Common Position also expressed the EU’s full support for the early establishment of the Court, indicated that the EU and its member states would encourage other states and international organizations to support the ICC, and encouraged the Bush administration to cooperate with the ICC as well.​[6]​
In the spring of 2002, as it became apparent that the sixty ratifications necessary for the Rome Statute to enter into force would soon be achieved, the Bush Administration launched a diplomatic campaign to ensure that the ICC would not affect Americans or the United States government. On April 11, the US boycotted a special ceremony at the UN for the ten countries whose deposit of instruments of ratification would make the ICC a reality.​[7]​ Several weeks later, the US government announced that it did not intend to ratify the Rome Statute and thus did not consider itself bound to comply with its provisions. In addition, senior administration officials expressed a strong commitment to ensuring that US officials and military personnel would never be subject to the new Court.​[8]​
In response, the EU once again achieved easy unanimity under CFSP in support of a declaration that criticized Washington’s repudiation of the ICC Statute as unwarranted and damaging to international law and reiterated the EU’s commitment to ending impunity for individuals who commit the most serious international crimes.​[9]​ As the ASPA legislation moved through the US Congress, Europeans expressed growing concern about its authorization of “all necessary means” to obtain the release of Americans held by the ICC. A London newspaper asked if Bush would invade England.​[10]​ The Dutch parliament passed a resolution expressing its concern about the ASPA bill, which it considered “detrimental to transatlantic relations.”​[11]​ 
	On June 17, the EU Council adopted Conclusions criticizing the ASPA legislation. Three days later, the EU adopted an Action Plan detailing its initiatives in support of the ICC, as well as a revised version of its Common Position on the ICC emphasizing the diplomatic and technical assistance it would provide to advance the good functioning of the Court. On June 23, the EU Presidency and the Commission expressed concern about the APSA in joint letters delivered to the US Senate and House of Representatives. On July 4, the European Parliament added its voice to this chorus of disapproval.​[12]​

Part IV: Two Case Studies




Case 1: ICC Immunity for UN Peacekeepers
The EU maintained its unity when Washington first took its anti-ICC campaign to the United Nations. Barely a week after renouncing its signature of the Rome Statute, the US threatened to veto renewal of the UN’s East Timor mission if the Security Council did not grant ICC immunity to international military and civilian personnel serving there. Although the US presence in East Timor was small (three unarmed military observers and about eighty police officers), a veto of the entire UN mission could have jeopardized stability on the newly-independent island. France and the United Kingdom lobbied against the US proposal. After failing for several days to gain the support of any other Security Council member, Washington decided to set aside its threatened veto.​[13]​
Six weeks later, though, on the same day that the Rome Statute entered into force, the US again signaled its opposition to the ICC by simultaneously withdrawing its three soldiers from East Timor and vetoing an extension of the mandate for the UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Europe, the American moves were seen as a challenge to the EU’s commitment to defend the integrity of the Rome Statute, and to its concrete interest in the security and stability of the Balkans.​[14]​ The US then proposed two alternative resolutions: one would have extended immunity only to peacekeepers deployed in Bosnia, while the second would have covered all peacekeepers involved in operations authorized or mandated by the UN. In response, France's UN ambassador argued that the Rome Statute allowed the Security Council to defer ICC investigations on a case-by-case basis when they would interfere with the Council's efforts to negotiate a peace agreement, but that the Statute was never designed to provide sweeping immunity from prosecution.​[15]​ 
	France, the United Kingdom, and Germany (then a rotating member of the Security Council) rejected both American proposals. Fearing that the Security Council standoff could threaten the continuity of the UN’s Mission in Bosnia, EU officials began preparing to replace it with EU forces, while Britain's UN ambassador prepared a resolution that would authorize the hand-over.​[16]​ Meanwhile, EU Commissioner Chris Patten again pleaded publicly for the US to reconsider its policy, which he said threatened international security and contradicted long-standing American support for human rights.​[17]​ This time, though, the Bush Administration did not relent in its quest for a UN Security Council resolution that would grant ICC immunity to UN peacekeepers. 
	The difficulty for the EU was that while all its member states opposed the US campaign, they did not all agree on how to respond. Germany favored an unequivocal rejection of Washington’s demand, which it believed would compromise both the UN Charter and the Rome Statute.​[18]​ On the other hand, while Tony Blair’s government had always been a strong supporter of the ICC, it began to reinterpret that position to accommodate its ‘special relationship’ with Washington. The US initiative also placed France in an awkward position: despite having signed and ratified the Rome Statute, France was the sole EU member to take advantage of Article 124, which permits states to exempt their nationals from the ICC’s jurisdiction over war crimes (but not genocide or crimes against humanity) for a seven-year period beginning with the Statute’s entry into force. With the UK showing sympathy for the US’s legal claim that as a non-Party to the ICC it should not be subject to the Court’s jurisdiction, EU member state positions began to diverge.
Given that this stage of the EU-US dispute concerned votes in the UN Security Council, where only a few EU members had seats, consultations between France, Germany and the UK did not lead to discussion of a common EU policy within CFSP. As a result, the informal norms and transgovernmental channels of CFSP were not engaged, supranational actors were marginalized, and NGOs had little opportunity to mobilize. In addition, as president of the UN Security Council at that time, the UK had special responsibilities beyond its membership in the EU. In such circumstances, the previous Common Positions on the ICC offered little precedent for the policy choices of the three EU states involved.
	Not surprisingly, the outcome was consistent with the expectations of the intergovernmental theory. At an open meeting of the Security Council on July 10, Denmark’s representative spoke for the EU presidency, praising the ICC as “a major leap forward in the development of international law,” suggesting that it was “understandable that the United States was seeking protection from politically motivated prosecutions,” and arguing that “those concerns had been met and sufficient safeguards against such accusations had been built into the Statute.”​[19]​ This much was consistent with the general Common Positions on the ICC that the EU had unanimously agreed in June 2001 and June 2002.
With respect to the specific issue on the table, though, the lowest common denominator position was an alternative resolution prepared by the UK that would limit ICC immunity for UN peacekeepers to one year and to the armed forces of States that were not Party to the Rome Statute.​[20]​ Anxious to maintain EU unity on the issue, Germany and France compromised and agreed to support the British proposal. Faced with European unity in opposition to its demands, Washington accepted the British proposal as well.
	On July 12, 2002, the Security Council voted unanimously in favor of Resolution 1422, giving peacekeepers from non-ICC party states immunity from the Court through June 30, 2003. In the end, the resolution conceded more to the US than some EU member states would have preferred, but fell far short of the broad and permanent immunity sought by Washington. As one Security Council diplomat put it, “The Europeans dug in their heels and said you are undermining something that is fundamental to us… The Americans blinked.”​[21]​

Case Study 2: Bilateral Agreements on ICC Immunity 
	While the negotiations over the Security Council resolution were still going on in June 2002, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld announced that Washington also intended to pursue bilateral agreements with governments around the world to protect US citizens, government officials, military personnel and other employees from surrender to the ICC.​[22]​ Speaking off the record, though, members of the administration conceded that their real goal was to protect senior US officials, whom they considered to be most at risk.​[23]​
	Such agreements, US officials argued, would be consistent with Article 98 of the Rome Statute, which addresses potential inconsistencies between obligations created by the Statute and those created by other international agreements. US officials thus typically referred to them as “Article 98 agreements” or “non-surrender agreements.” In contrast, most Europeans and most ICC experts (including David Scheffer, the chief American negotiator of the Rome Statute) argued that Article 98 had been crafted to accommodate Status of Forces agreements and extradition treaties that were already in effect when the Statute entered into force, not to facilitate new agreements to limit the jurisdiction of the new Court (Scheffer 2002). They began referring to the US pursuit of “immunity agreements” or even “impunity agreements.”
Most EU leaders saw the proposed bilateral agreements as the latest US challenge to the integrity of the Rome Statute and thus to the good functioning of the ICC itself. Unlike the UN resolution, these agreements fell clearly within the policymaking scope of the CFSP. However, more was at stake than simply the EU’s commitment to the ICC. Denying the US request could provoke a further confrontation with Europe’s most important ally and the world’s only superpower. In addition, there was real tension between the EU’s public commitment to support the ICC and its general commitment to international law, which traditionally limits the jurisdiction of international treaties to states that have accepted them. The issue also engaged the long-standing division between the EU’s more “Atlanticist” and “Europeanist” member states. Finally, as the weeks passed, the ICC immunity issue began to overlap with the controversial diplomatic and then military build-up to the invasion of Iraq, over which the EU was increasingly divided. A common EU policy on ICC immunity agreements for the United States in mid-late 2002 was thus no easy matter for CFSP.
	In response to direct overtures from Washington, Berlin announced on July 23 that it could not consider US requests for bilateral agreements until the entire EU had deliberated on a common policy. This announcement, which effectively set the CFSP process in motion, was a major setback for the US, which had hoped that a positive response from Germany would set an example across Europe.​[24]​ Three days later, the Council’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) discussed the matter, and agreed to inform Washington that the EU remained committed to its Common Position to support the ICC and to preserve the integrity of the Rome Statute, and that it could not reply further to the US request until it completed an in-depth analysis.​[25]​ This procedural agreement reinforced that salience of the existing Common Position as precedent for the issue of bilateral agreements.
	In early August, the European Commission got involved in the issue. In its role as the EU’s negotiator with candidate member states, the Commission had been asked by candidate states whether the EU would consider a bilateral agreement with Washington to be consistent with the requirements of the Rome Statute. Upon the request of Commission President Romano Prodi’s office, the Commission’s Legal Service prepared a written opinion on August 13 stating clearly that such agreements were inconsistent with the Rome Statute itself and with the commitment to support the effective functioning of the ICC that the EU had agreed and expressed in two Common Positions.​[26]​ Based on this opinion, which was well received by Prodi’s office, the Commission strongly advised candidate states that they should refuse to sign a bilateral agreement with the US.
	The Commission opinion was also circulated to the member states through the EU’s confidential Coreu message system. All recognized that the opinion was potentially of great significance. If the EU were to translate its logic directly into a common policy, none of the fifteen member states -- all of whom had ratified the Statute -- would have been able to reach bilateral agreements with the US. This in turn would have undermined Washington’s efforts to convince other states around the world to sign such agreements.
	Many of the EU member states were already sympathetic to the position expressed by the Commission, but others appreciated the clarity of its argument on this emerging issue. Another factor was the automatic sympathy that the smaller member states have for the Commission’s Legal Service, which they tend to regard as protective of their interests through its commitment to European and international law. However, the member states were not unanimous in this view. Perhaps because some were fearful of the opinion’s potential consequences for the issue at hand, or perhaps simply because they resented the Commission’s assertiveness on a CFSP issue, they told the Commission in no uncertain terms that it had overstepped its competence. The Commission responded by keeping a low profile during the CFSP deliberations over the next six weeks, but its Legal Service’s opinion continued to influence the process.​[27]​
	The US government also learned of the Commission opinion, which contributed to its growing awareness that opposition to the quest for bilateral agreements was mounting in Europe. Three days after the Commission opinion was released, US Secretary of State Colin Powell wrote to a number of his European counterparts recommending that they not wait for a common EU position and threatening that failure to sign bilateral agreements could have negative consequences for the United States’ role in European security.​[28]​ Powell’s demarche was seen in EU capitals as heavy-handed interference, and stiffened the resolve of some member states to resist American overtures.​[29]​
On the other hand, Washington’s anti-ICC campaign succeeded in its goal of forcing EU member states to balance their commitment to support the Rome Statute against their desire to avoid a major trans-Atlantic dispute. As one EU diplomat explained, “We are coming under huge pressure from Washington. All it takes is one member state to give in and it undermines the credibility of the ICC.”​[30]​ Given that the EU had just updated its Common Position on the ICC two months earlier, he could have added that a failure of EU unity would undermine the credibility of the CFSP as well.
	By late August, only Israel, Romania, East Timor and Tajikistan had signed bilateral immunity agreements with the US. But given the global spread of Washington’s campaign on this issue, it seemed to be only a matter of time before other governments signed as well. The formerly Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe, which wanted to become members of both NATO and the EU, found themselves caught between American and European preferences. “I can’t remember anything they put so much weight or interest into,” Romania’s foreign minister said of the US campaign.​[31]​ In an effort to forestall this eventuality, the EU presidency instructed all EU candidate states (including Romania, whose Parliament had not yet ratified the government’s signature) that it disapproved of signing bilateral accords in the absence of an agreed EU policy.
The existence and content of the Commission’s legal opinion leaked to the press at the end of August, just two days before the EU foreign ministers were scheduled to discuss the issue.​[32]​ With a Financial Times headline declaring “Bilateral pacts with US a violation, says EU,” the foreign ministers were no longer able to assume that their deliberations would go unnoticed by national parliaments and publics who supported the ICC. The fact that the legal opinion had been drafted by the European Commission, and not the EU Council, would make little difference to most readers. Human rights NGOs stepped up their pressure on the EU for a negative answer to Washington. A flexible EU policy on bilateral agreements was thus framed in public discourse as illegal before the member states even began to negotiate.
	Among the EU member states, Germany remained outspoken in its opposition to the US request, and was supported in this position (to varying degrees) by Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Their opposition was motivated both by a principled rejection of American exceptionalism with regard to international law and a practical concern that granting special immunity to the US would defeat the purpose of the ICC by inviting other states around the world whose judicial systems were far less protective of human rights to seek immunity for themselves as well. If EU member states signed immunity agreements with the US, they feared, it would be politically difficult, if not impossible, to refuse similar requests from others.​[33]​
On the other side of the debate, Italy and the United Kingdom openly favored a more flexible response to Washington that would permit bilateral agreements, and were supported (to varying degrees) by Denmark, Portugal and Spain. As they saw the issue, the US plays a unique role in maintaining international peace and security, so its concerns about the ICC must be addressed.​[34]​ As the foreign ministers prepared for their meeting at Elsinore on August 31, the question was whether the minority of member states that favored a flexible response to Washington could trump the majority of member states, supported by the European Commission, the European Parliament, and an attentive public, which all favored a negative response.
If the logic of the intergovernmental theory prevailed, those who favored a flexible response should have been able to deny any EU policy that did not meet their preference. Their knowledge that most of the members favoring a negative response to Washington also valued EU unity on this issue would only strengthen the bargaining position of the “flexible” camp. For example, while Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh feared that accommodating the US would undermine the Court, she openly concluded that “the most important thing is that the EU stick together.”​[35]​
On the other hand, there were powerful pressures on London and Rome to compromise their positions: both governments had already alienated many of their EU counterparts with their support of US policy on Iraq and thus could have been expected to seize the high-profile ICC issue as an opportunity to comply with the EU’s written and unwritten rules that encourage member states to reach consensus under CFSP. Despite these pressures, the Italian and British foreign ministers made clear to their EU colleagues at Elsinore that unless the EU found a way to accommodate US concerns in its common policy, Rome and London would break ranks and sign agreements with Washington.​[36]​ These threats thus appear to reflect real policy preferences and intentions on the issue at hand.
	At the end of the Elsinore meeting, the foreign ministers announced that they had agreed to pursue a common response to Washington that would maintain the integrity of the Rome Statute and respond constructively to US concerns within that framework.​[37]​ Amnesty International responded by slamming Italy and the UK for taking positions that threatened the Rome Statute, but the theoretical significance of this initial compromise are about as unclear as the policy implications were to most observers at the time.​[38]​ If the first part of the agreement were to win out, it would be consistent with the compromise policy expectation of the institutionalist theory. If the second part were to win out, it would lend credence to the lowest common denominator expectation of the intergovernmental theory. The CFSP policymaking process then began working to translate the awkward Elsinore compromise into an EU policy that every member state could accept.
The first formal step in this process was a meeting in Brussels of COJUR, the Council’s working group on public international law. Although COJUR is normally composed of the foreign ministers’ chief legal advisors, this meeting involved COJUR’s ICC sub-group, which had been created earlier to handle the growing volume of ICC-related work in CFSP. The members of the sub-group knew each other well and communicated on a regular basis. Many had been their governments’ chief negotiator of the Rome Statute, and all were experts on the ICC. As a result, every member was personally committed to the ICC: regardless of their governments’ position on bilateral agreements, most considered the US quest for immunity to be an assault on the Court.​[39]​
Before COJUR convened, though, the Danish foreign ministry, which then held the EU’s rotating presidency, consulted intensively with its fourteen counterparts regarding what they could and could not support. Despite the Elsinore compromise and the presidency’s consultations, the COJUR meeting was contentious. Not surprisingly, the UK and Germany led the arguments for and against a flexible response to Washington’s request.​[40]​ In the end, COJUR agreed on the basic elements of a common EU policy that they would recommend to higher levels in the CFSP hierarchy. As Germany was insisting, they agreed that the draft agreement proposed by Washington was incompatible with the obligations imposed by the Rome Statute, which would effectively prohibit any EU member state from signing the text that US officials were circulating. On the other hand, the COJUR framework included four points that were closer to the conditions preferred by the UK: new bilateral agreements were permissible under Article 98; such agreements could not allow impunity for those exempted from ICC jurisdiction; they could only cover military personnel and officials; they could not cover citizens of a State Party to the Statute.​[41]​
	While the Council was deliberating under CFSP, other European institutions expressed their views on the issue. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe passed a resolution declaring that the agreements proposed by Washington were incompatible with the Rome Statute and calling upon Council of Europe members (which included all the EU member states) not to sign such agreements. The following day, the European Parliament adopted a resolution expressing its view that signature of an agreement that undermines the effective implementation of the Rome Statute was incompatible with EU membership.​[42]​ The White House’s release of its new National Security Strategy of the United States of America, which included an explicit rejection of the ICC as a Court whose jurisdiction the US does not accept, only strengthened the convictions of the anti-flexibility camp.​[43]​
The EU Presidency then prepared an elaborated version of the COJUR recommendations, which its legal experts discussed with their U.S. counterparts in late September.​[44]​ (This followed a meeting at the UN General Assembly meeting in New York earlier in the month, where senior EU officials exchanged views on the issue with Secretary of State Colin Powell.) The Presidency’s draft was debated and approved by PSC on September 25 and 27. After approval by COREPER later on the 27th, the draft Council Conclusions were finalized by the PSC on September 30, just hours before the meeting of the General Affairs Council.
Although Germany had initiated the process of developing a common EU policy on the bilaterals, its government reportedly hesitated as the policy took shape. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer was deeply committed to the ICC and reluctant to endorse a policy that could be seen to authorize actions that, in his view, would weaken the Court. Germany’s representative to COJUR’s ICC sub-group, Hans-Peter Kaul, then spoke with Fischer. The draft EU deal was closer to Germany’s position than Fischer may have realized, Kaul indicated. If Fischer insisted on his position, London and/or Rome were likely to refuse to renegotiate. The resulting collapse of EU unity in the face of Washington’s global campaign would be worse for the ICC than a compromise agreement. Fischer relented and the CFSP process continued.​[45]​
In its September 30 meeting, the General Affairs Council issued the EU’s policy on bilateral agreements in the form of Conclusions that reaffirmed the EU’s support for the effective functioning of the ICC and expressed its belief that the Rome Statute provided all the necessary safeguards against the use of the Court for politically motivated purposes. In addition, the Conclusions signalled the readiness of EU Member States to discuss with the US how its concerns could be accommodated within existing agreements. Finally, the Conclusions included a set of EU Guiding Principles to guide any State Party to the Rome Statute (including but not necessarily limited to the EU’s member states) that wishes to reach an arrangement regarding the conditions of surrender of persons to the ICC.​[46]​
Notwithstanding Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Moller’s insistence that there was “no concession… no undermining of the ICC” in the Council Conclusions, they were clearly filled with compromises.​[47]​ The real question is whose preferences were compromised. In an opinion piece written for an American audience, Moller referred diplomatically to “a good compromise” between US concerns about the ICC and the EU’s commitment to the integrity of Rome Statute.​[48]​ As described below, though, the Conclusions were in fact less a compromise between the EU and the US than a compromise between the divergent preferences of the UK and Germany, as expected by the institutionalist theory of CFSP.
The Guiding Principles were drafted to ensure that any bilateral arrangement would be maximally consistent with the obligation of States Parties to cooperate fully with the ICC. In particular, they stipulate that (1) existing international agreements (such as extradition treaties and SOFAs) should be taken into account; (2) the draft agreements proposed by the US are inconsistent with the Statute; (3) any arrangement must ensure that persons who have committed crimes covered by the Statute are investigated and punished; (4) no arrangement for non-surrender can apply to nationals of an ICC State Party; and (5) any such arrangement can only cover government officials or military personnel. 
In that the Conclusions did not expressly forbid EU member states from signing a bilateral agreement with the United States under Article 98 of the Rome Statute, they reflect the British and Italian government’s insistence on their right (and intent) to do so. However, the preferences of the majority of EU member states are clearly reflected in the rejection of the text proposed by Washington and in the strict requirements that any new agreement would have to meet. In order to comply with the Guiding Principles, the United States would have to stop seeking immunity for US citizens who were not sent abroad on government business, stop seeking immunity for citizens of states party to the Rome Statute who were working for the US government (most likely as private contractors), demonstrate that US courts have jurisdiction over all crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC as defined in the Statute (which is not presently the case), and commit to investigate in good faith all credible accusations of such crimes. Given the deep suspicions of international law in general and the ICC in particular that prevailed in the US government during this period, such actions were highly unlikely.
Once the EU policy was announced, observers waited to see whether Italy or the UK would exploit the flexibility contained in the Conclusions and sign an agreement with the United States, as they had threatened to do less than one month earlier. At this point, the policymaking process was replaced by a process of competitive “spin” in which various parties sought to move events in their preferred direction by shaping public perceptions of what had been agreed. The German government was particularly active in this process. Emerging from the GAC, Joschka Fischer described the Conclusions as a virtual rejection of bilateral agreements: “We are against the conclusion of special agreements and we will not conclude such an agreement… We would have wished a clear rejection of the agreements. Because of the Principles we are very close to such a position.”​[49]​ 
Within the British Parliament, supporters of the ICC urged the government not to sign bilateral immunity agreements with Washington, while the Minister for Trade praised the EU Conclusions for authorizing an alternative to the time-limited immunity provided by the UN Security Council resolution: “We need something far more solid than that, and we have a means of getting it.” ​[50]​ In mid-October, an Under-Secretary from the British Foreign Office told the House of Lords that the government was “beginning discussions with the United States on the possibility of a bilateral agreement.”​[51]​ 
Hoping to head off any such possibility, the European Parliament passed a strongly worded resolution on October 24 calling on “the governments and parliaments of the Member States to refrain from adopting any agreement which undermines the effective implementation of the Rome Statute.”​[52]​ That same day, Germany’s Foreign Office released a detailed analysis of the Council Conclusions designed to bolster its view that they constituted a de facto (if not de jure) prohibition on signing bilateral immunity agreements.​[53]​ The non-governmental Coalition for the ICC agreed with the German memorandum (which it posted on the CICC website), and mobilized its lobbying efforts accordingly. At the next COJUR meeting, the British member expressed London’s strong displeasure with the German memorandum, which led others to conclude that the UK was still leaning toward signing an agreement.​[54]​
Despite these multiple indications that the British government intended to sign a bilateral agreement, and that it believed this would be consistent with the Council Conclusions, pressure from EU and transnational channels has apparently made it difficult for London to do so. A special US ambassador travelled to London, Madrid, Rome and Vienna for discussion of the issue in late 2002, but failed to achieve any agreements.  The Foreign Ministry of Portugal, which had tacitly supported the British and Italians during the negotiation of the Council Conclusions, rejected a bilateral agreement proposed by Washington after receiving a negative legal opinion from the Consultative Committee of the General Attorney’s office, and decided to “freeze” further discussion of the issue.​[55]​  The Dutch Foreign Ministry simply announced that existing treaties would make it “impossible for the Netherlands to honor a request for the surrender of US citizens to the Court without US permission…”​[56]​ In the end, no EU member state has signed a bilateral agreement on ICC immunity with the US since the Council Conclusions were agreed, and the US has apparently abandoned its effort to obtain such agreements from EU members.
The closest that any member state has come is a provision within the revised U.S.-U.K. Extradition Treaty, which was signed in March 2003. According to Article 18(2) of the treaty, “A person extradited under the Treaty may not be the subject of onward extradition or surrender for any offense committed prior to the extradition to the Requesting State unless the Requested State consents.”​[57]​ Not surprisingly, the US State Department heralded the apparent concession.​[58]​ However, this provision covers situations where the UK would request extradition of an individual held by the US, not the situation that was centrally at stake in the dispute over bilateral immunity agreements: the surrender to the ICC of US nationals or government employees held by a state that is a party to the Rome Statute. This is far less than the ability to accommodate US demands that the UK and Italy had insisted upon when they threatened to deny EU agreement at Elsinore.
In sum, we see that EU member states have been very reluctant to act on the latitude that the September 30, 2002 Council Conclusions provided for them to sign a bilateral agreement on ICC immunity with the United States. Given that the member states were subject to intense US pressure to sign such agreements, and two threatened to break EU unity on the ICC in order to retain this right, the evidence suggests that they have not done so because of the various pressures within a multi-level EU to comply with the spirit (as well as the letter) of agreements reached under CFSP. This finding supports the institutionalist expectation of high compliance with EU common policies, rather than the intergovernmentalist expectation that member states will seek to exploit such policies.

Part V: Conclusions 
While two case studies should not be treated as a definitive test of any theoretical proposition, these studies have a number of interesting implications for our understanding of EU foreign policy in particular and European integration in general. First, they demonstrate that CFSP skeptics are correct to assert that as long as common policies require unanimous support, “the EU will be hampered... by the constant threat of having one of its numerous member states break from its ranks” (Meunier 2000:132). This threat appears to have forced France and Germany to accept the UK’s position within the UN Security Council, and it forced the majority of EU foreign ministers to make real concessions to the UK and Italy at their Elsinore meeting on bilateral agreements. Some elements of the Intergovernmental theory are thus clearly consistent with the dynamics of EU foreign policy making.
However, the case studies provide powerful evidence that the EU’s foreign policymaking process is not condemned to result in LCD outcomes that are then exploited by the member states. As shown by the deliberations over the Council Conclusions on the ICC, the informal rules of CFSP and the diverse actors involved in the process can lead the EU to adopt common policies that reflect a real compromise among member state preferences. These findings are consistent with the Institutionalist theory of EU foreign policy presented in this paper and with studies of other areas of EU decision-making that question the “hard bargaining” image of the Council (Lewis 1998). Predictions that CFSP will “remain intergovernmental” thus gloss over potentially-important institutional variations within the EU foreign policymaking process (Wagner 2003).
The second case study also demonstrates the potential power of public framing and rhetorical pressure in EU foreign policymaking. Although the Commission’s Legal Service had little statutory role in CFSP, the distribution and then media leak of its opinion on ICC bilateral agreements shaped public expectations and thus steered the ensuing debate within the Council. If qualified majority voting becomes more prevalent in CFSP, these processes of public framing should gain importance, since small numbers of member states will be less able to block agreement on common policies. Similarly, once a compromise policy was adopted, the UK and Italy found their freedom of maneuver constrained by rhetorical pressure from actors with different preferences, including other member states, national parliaments, the European Parliament, and NGOs. As a result, while both the UK and Italy insisted on the flexibility to sign bilateral agreements, and even threatened EU unity in order to guarantee this flexibility, neither has done so.
These latter findings do not imply that CFSP decision-making will necessarily or always depart significantly from the pattern expected by Intergovernmentalism. The contrast between the lowest common denominator outcome in the case of the UN resolution and the compromise outcome in the case of bilateral agreements indicates a need for further research on the conditions under which EU foreign policy is likely to fit intergovernmentalist versus institutionalist theory. Given the nature of the two cases, the institutional setting in which EU foreign policy cooperation occurs appears to matter a great deal. In the first case, member states were required only to consult with each other and to respect pre-existing EU positions. In the second case, once they agreed that the EU should have a common policy, the outcome was strongly influenced by by pressure from supranational and non-state actors and especially by norms of compromise and consensus within a highly institutionalized CFSP process. Research with broader case selection could assess the reliability of this finding.
Another possible source of variation in CFSP outcomes would be whether or not a common policy (or set of policies) already governs member states on the issue at hand. In what we may call Type 1 situations, no EU common policy exists but one or several have been proposed. Here, the status quo is when the member states reject the proposal(s), and change is when they adopt a common policy. In Type 2 situations, an EU common policy does exist but a new one has been proposed. Here, the status quo is when the existing common policy is maintained, and change is when the EU adopts a new common policy or reverts to having no common policy. If Institutionalist theory is correct, then median policy outcomes would be more likely in Type 2 situations, where an existing policy highlights the Union’s prior commitment on an issue and thus reduces the likelihood and credibility of threats to defect by individual member states or minority groupings within the Council.
A third possibility is that the variation in policy-making dynamics depends upon the type of policy instrument under consideration. One could imagine, for example, that member states are more likely to engage in “hard bargaining” and thus more likely to provoke LCD outcomes, when negotiating over legally binding instruments such as common strategies, joint actions and common positions than over politically-binding instruments such as declarations and conclusions. However, CFSP practitioners tend to report that the distinction between a legal and a political obligation in the EU has little significance in CFSP, where the European Court of Justice has no oversight.​[59]​
A final possibility is that the answer depends upon the type of issue at stake. Sophie Meunier’s (2000) conclusion that the EU’s external relations will always be subject to lowest common denominator dynamics was based on a study of EU-US relations in the area of trade, which falls outside the scope of CFSP. As a general proposition, though, issue-area per se is a weak explanation for variations in foreign policymaking (Evangelista 1989). With respect to the EU, in fact, a focus on issue-area would probably lead one to expect median outcomes on trade policy, where the Commission has strong competence and majority voting dominates, and LCD outcomes within CFSP, where the Commission is weak and unanimity voting prevails.
Notwithstanding the need for further research, these cases show that the EU is not inevitably hobbled as an international actor by the Catch-22 dilemma of individual member state weakness and unanimity decision-making. Instead, we see that the EU is capable, at least under certain conditions, of agreeing on common foreign policies that bridge the divergent preferences of its member states and exert a significant impact on international outcomes. In the case of the ICC, most observers agree that without EU unity, the Rome Statute would have been weaker (if it were completed at all) and the United States would have been more successful in its effort to reduce the scope of the Court. This finding undermines blanket assertions that the EU is “too strong to be Washington’s lackey, but too weak and divided to be either an effective partner or a formidable counterweight” (Kupchan 2003:226).
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